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Flexible work time arrangements have become more and more popular over the past 
decades. While they allow firms to adjust quickly to demand fluctuations, employees may 
benefit in terms of more time sovereignty. Depending on the specific type of arrangement 
the corresponding wage effects are ambiguous and have not been analyzed in detail. 
According to the theory of compensating wage differentials, workers with more time 
sovereignty might be willing to forego earnings whereas employees who are supposed to 
adjust their working time by order of the employer have to be compensated by higher wages. 
We analyze the actual wage differentials due to flexible work time schedules with data from 
the GSOEP. The sample year 2002 includes information on whether the respondents’ 
working hours are debited and credited to individual work time accounts (WTA) within the 
accounting systems of their employing firm. To control for selection on observable 
characteristics, we choose propensity score matching and compare wages of employees with 
and without WTAs. To take account of observed and unobserved sector-specific 
heterogeneity we apply a combined matching procedure consisting of a pre-matching on 
"working in the public sector" versus “working in the private sector”, followed by a 
propensity score matching within these sectors. Additional variation in the treatment effect 
with respect to individual or firm-specific characteristics is analyzed by a second-step 
estimation using the wage differences between the matched pairs as dependent variable. Our 
results indicate that work time accountees receive higher wages on average. That is, the 
average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) is positive, for male as well as female 
workers, suggesting an employer’s discretion to determine the timing of flexible work hours. 
However, remarkable differences exist on the sector and qualification levels. 
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With flexible work time arrangements firms can quickly adjust to demand 
fluctuations, while employees may benefit from more time sovereignty. Depending on the 
specific type of arrangement the accompanying wage effects are ambiguous and have rarely 
been analyzed. According to the theory of compensating wage differentials, workers with 
more time sovereignty may be willing to forego earnings whereas others need to be 
compensated by higher earnings. We analyze the wage effects of work time accounts using 
GSOEP data from 2002. We compare wages of employees with and without work time 
accounts by propensity score matching. Our results indicate that work time accountees 
receive higher wages on average, thus suggesting an employer’s discretion to determine the 
timing of flexible work hours, but with remarkable differences across sectors. 
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1 Introduction 
Flexible work time arrangements have gained popularity in Germany over the past decades. 
The traditional form of work time flexibility such as discretionary flexibility in starting or 
finishing hours, often combined with a fixed window of compulsory presence hours, is still 
the predominant type of flextime. However, in many firms employees’ working hours can 
now be shifted between weeks or even months. In Germany, more and more firms are 
implementing accounting systems – so-called work time accounts (WTA) – where 
employees’ working hours are debited and credited to individual time accounts that have to 
be balanced within a specified period. The balancing period may thereby vary between a 
month and several decades in the case of lifetime accounts. The percentage of establishments 
providing WTAs and the percentage of the workforce covered by WTAs range between 30 
and 70% in Germany, depending on methodology and scope of the respective survey (Seifert 
2003).
1 Despite the growing importance of flextime arrangements, the financial 
consequences for employees have hardly been studied. In this paper, we will therefore assess 
the effect of a WTA on an employee’s wage rate.  
WTAs may evoke opposing effects on wages. Depending on the decrease or increase in time 
sovereignty by employees, the compensating wage differentials may be positive or negative. 
On one hand, flexible time schedules allow the firm to adjust quickly to demand fluctuations 
without paying an overtime premium. Empirical evidence for Germany suggests that this is 
the main reason to adopt flexible working hours (DIHT 2000, Klenner 1997). According to 
the theory of compensating wage differentials, substantial and long-lived changes in job 
characteristics should be observed to affect wages (Rosen 1986). As a result, employees may 
ask for financial compensation for the increased uncertainty regarding the timing and 
duration of their working time. Hence, shifting the employer’s risk on to the staff is then 
expected to result in higher average wage rates (see e.g. Gariety and Shaffer 2001). In some 
cases, flexible work time arrangements might involve an implicit agreement to provide work 
at abnormal times of the day, which also works towards a positive compensation.  
On the other hand, employees may benefit from innovative work time arrangements in terms 
of more time sovereignty. In general, work councils succeed in enforcing some kind of time 2 
                                                                                                                                                      
sovereignty for their staff, sometimes as an exchange for the foregone overtime benefits.
2 
Hence, if workers’ marginal utility of leisure varies over the day, week or year, the timing of 
the actual work schedule might have decisive effects on work satisfaction. Provided that a 
flexible work time schedule better matches the individual preferences of an employee or that 
he or she relies on a flexible work time arrangement – be it due to family responsibilities, 
commuting or other personal reasons – he or she might be willing to accept a lower wage 
rate compared to a job with fixed working times. However, if flexible work hours reduce 
one’s time sovereignty because they are mainly determined by the firm, positive 
compensating wage differentials become likely (Bell and Hart 2003).  
Flexible working hours, as a means to adjust labor input, may furthermore be interpreted as a 
mutual insurance between employer and employee (Carstensen 2000). The argument is that 
workers gain job security, since the use of WTAs or other types of flexible work schedules 
makes dismissals more unlikely. As an insurance benefit, workers are supposed to accept 
lower wages, for example by renouncing overtime premiums in boom times, or the 
willingness to share in the employer’s risk as discussed above. Apart from that, flexible time 
schedules might effect absenteeism and individual productivity (see e.g. Ralston, Anthony 
and Gustafson 1985, McGuire and Liro 1986, Dalton and Mesch 1990 or Shepard, Clifton 
and Kruse 1996). 
Which of these diverse effects is predominant is not clear from a theoretical perspective. In 
practice, the resulting wage effects depend on employees’ preferences and how employers or 
employees decide on when and how much has to be worked. Whereas workers with high 
preferences for job security or time sovereignty might be willing to forego earnings in order 
to benefit from WTAs, accountees who are supposed to adjust their working time by order of 
the employer, have to be paid higher wages. 
The goal of this paper is to identify empirically the wage premium or discount for work time 
flexibility, namely WTAs. We choose propensity score (PS) matching and compare wages of 
 
1   Seifert (2003) draws on company surveys by Bellmann and Ludewig (2000) and DIHT (2000), staff surveys 
by Bundesmann-Jansen et al. (2000) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2002) and work council surveys by Seifert 
(2001). 
2    According to the survey conducted by the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 31% of the 
“flexible” firms report that motivation played a decisive role for the adoption of flexible working hours. This 
observation suggests that a considerable part of employees were able to extend their time sovereignty. Among 
firms in the service sector and companies with more than 1000 employees this holds true for even 50% (DIHT 
2000). 3 
                                                
employees with and without WTAs, conditional on their likelihood of having an account and 
thereby controlling for selection on observable characteristics. Referring to the literature on 
differences between employees in the public and private sector, we argue that the sector 
choice is a good indicator for an individual’s preferences towards specific workplace 
characteristics, such as safety, earnings level and flexibility, and may take up part of the 
selection process based on unobservables.
3 For this reason, we apply a combined matching 
procedure, consisting of a pre-matching on "working in the public sector", followed by a PS 
matching within sectors to accommodate differences between the private and public sector. 
This procedure allows us to take into account observed and unobserved sector-specific 
heterogeneity. Additional variation in the treatment effect with respect to individual or firm-
specific characteristics is analyzed by a second-step estimation using the wage differences 
between the matched pairs as dependent variable.  
Our results indicate that work time accountees receive higher wages on average than would 
be the case if their hours were not debited or credited. That is, the average treatment effects 
on the treated (ATT) are positive, for male as well as female workers. However, remarkable 
differences exist on the sector and qualification level. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of the 
evaluation approach and Section 3 of the data. The wage effects for female and male 
employees are presented and interpreted in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2  The evaluation approach  
In this section, we briefly present our econometric approach to determine the wage effects of 
WTAs. Our research question may be interpreted as a classical evaluation problem, since we 
can only observe persons that either have or do not have a WTA, but never both at the same 
 
3   There exists comprehensive evidence that public and private sector jobs do not only differ with regard to 
wages (see e.g. Dustmann and van Soest 1998) and the pension system, but also in several other ways, such as 
hiring and advancement opportunities, job security and skill requirements (see e.g. Blank 1985). Bellante and 
Link (1981), for instance, show that measured risk aversion among workers is significantly correlated with 
sector choice. Those with poor health, and those who are more risk averse, should thus be more likely to seek 
employment in the less economically pressured sector. Nielsen, Simonsen and Verner (2003) point out that a 
job in the public sector is more likely to provide family-friendly working conditions. Hence, individuals – 
especially women who expect to have children – may prefer to work in the public sector in order to benefit 
from family friendly policy measures and to avoid huge wage penalties due to child-related employment 
breaks. time. Solving this problem requires credible estimates of the counterfactual outcomes that 
would have been realised, had persons been differently assigned to WTAs.  
Let Y1 denote the wage rate of individuals with a WTA and Y0 the wage rate of those 
without. The difference between both potential outcomes (Y0i and Y1i) for a given person 
represents the financial impact of the WTA. In formal terms, the impact Δi for person i is 
given by: 
10 . iii YY Δ= −  
It is, however, unlikely that all individuals are equally affected by the use of WTAs. For one 
thing, it may be the case that those employees whose productivity is expected to gain most 
from flexible work schedules are more likely to be offered a WTA. Furthermore, individuals 
who are able to negotiate higher compensations for uncertain working hours may have more 
incentives to opt for a WTA. As a result, the impact of WTAs will more likely be positive 
and larger for account users compared to employees who still work under traditional work 
time arrangements. In our analysis, we therefore focus on the impact of WTAs on wages of 
employees who actually use an account, that is, the average effect of treatment on the treated 
(ATT): 
() () 1 1 0 1 = − = ≡ i i i i D Y E D Y E ATT
where Di is an indicator variable which equals one if person i has a WTA and equals zero 
otherwise.  
The average treatment effect (ATE), on the contrary, measures the wage gain or loss for an 
average worker, unconditional on having an account or not. By comparing both effects we 
will be able to deduce information on the selection process into WTAs.  
2.1  Matching to control for selection on observables 
A simplistic approach to estimate the wage effect of WTAs would be to compare the wage 
rates of accountees and non-accountees. This would be a valid approach if accountees 
formed a randomly selected subgroup of all employees. However, the effect will be 
underestimated if, for instance, firms doing particularly badly are more likely to offer WTAs. 
In contrast, if WTAs are primarily offered to employees with more favourable labour market 
characteristics, a positive effect will overestimate the true wage differential. Thus, a 
selection bias may emerge if the use of WTAs is related to the wage rate.  
4 To account for this possible selection effect, we apply the method of matching, which 
explains the selection purely in terms of observable characteristics (Rubin 1974).
4 Every 
person in the treatment group (the accountees) is matched to a comparable individual from 
the non-treated group (non-accountees), who is determined by observable characteristics. 
The mean effect of treatment is then the average difference in wage rates between matched 
accountees and non-accountees. 
The approach rests on an identifying assumption which is known as the Conditional Mean 
Independence Assumption (CMIA) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). According to this, Y0 is 
the same for treated and untreated individuals in expectation, if we control for differences in 
observable characteristics.  
() () 1, 0, oo EYD X EYD X == = 
Now we can infer the counterfactual wage rate for the accountees. Any differences between 
treated and non-treated individuals are attributed to the effect of WTAs. In the present study, 
we assume that selection into a job with a WTA is taken up by our set of firm and individual 
characteristics. We argue that the introduction of WTAs in a firm is at the discretion of the 
employer rather than the individual employee. However, to account for individual 
preferences towards certain job characteristics, among which also work time flexibility, we 
only allow matches within the public respectively private sector.  
It is also assumed that for all values of X there is a positive probability of either participating 
(D=1) or not participating (D=0), i.e 
5
0P r ( 1)1a n d0P r ( 0) DX DX <= < <= 1 <
                                                
 
This implies the existence of an additional variable – not included in X and observable or not 
– which effects the probability of using a WTA. Such a random variation could come from 
preferences towards leisure activities.  
 
4   We cannot preclude bias if unobservables have a non-random impact on the two processes as well. 
However, a judicious use of observable characteristics helps to minimise the bias. 
5 
5   Since our parameter of interest is the ATT, the condition 0 < Pr(D=1|X) is not required, because that 
condition guarantees that the probability of using a WTA of a non-accountee equals the probability of an 
accountee. 6 
                                                
2.2  Matching algorithms 
In practice, the chances to find an exact match conditional on specified characteristics 
diminish with the number of relevant individual characteristics (curse of dimensionality). 
We overcome this obstacle by applying propensity score (PS) matching: Participants and 
non-participants are matched based on their estimated probability to belong to the treatment 
group (P(X)).
6  
The first step in selecting comparable individuals is to estimate a participation model and 
derive the PS of being treated. The variables used in the model should influence both, having 
a WTA and the wage rate as the outcome variable. In the next step, non-accountees are 
matched to accountees based on their PS = P(X). To select appropriate controls we apply the 
nearest neighbour matching (NNM) with replacement, where for each accountee that one 
non-accountee with the closest P(X) is selected. Since a non-treated individual may be 
matched to more than one treated individual, the probability of finding a more or less 




The data used for the analysis is drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 
The GSOEP is a yearly microdata panel which has been conducted in annual interviews of 
individuals and households since 1984 in West Germany and since 1990 in East Germany. In 
2002, information on the existence of WTAs has been included in the questionnaire for the 
first time. For this reason, our analysis is based on cross-section data from this year. The 
2002-sample of West and East Germany comprises 13,000 households and 23,000 
respondents in total.  
We restrict our sample to observations with reliable information on their market wage, 
hence, we drop all self-employed, unemployed, students, individuals in special training 
programs or national services (military and civil) as well as people with disabilities (of more 
than 50 percent on the official disability scale). Elderly workers on special part-time 
 
6 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that matching on P(X) produces consistent estimates of the treatment 
effect. 
7 A detailed discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of different PS matching algorithms can be 
found in Dehejia and Wahba (1998) and Imbens (2004). retirement schemes are also excluded from the sample. Our data contain people aged 
between 20 and 60 years, leading to observations from 4,448 males and 3,883 females who 
provide reliable information on monthly gross earnings and contractual respective actual 
working hours.  
As hourly wage rates are not observed directly, we construct this variable by dividing current 
monthly gross earnings by the number of working hours. Since deviations from contractual 
working hours are supposed to be settled within a certain time period, we use the stipulated 
total number of contractual weekly hours (multiplied by 4.3) for individuals with WTAs and 
employees of the control group whose overtime hours are compensated by time-off (but do 
not have a WTA). However, in the case that overtime hours are not compensated with time-
off, actual weekly working hours are used to calculate the hourly wage rate (see Figure 1). 
Since the definition of the dependent variable may have crucial effects on the estimation 
results, we test different definitions of the hourly wage rate.
8 The results hardly depend on 
the measure of working hours. Hence, we present estimation results only for the definition of 
weekly working hours described in Figure 1. The information on the existence of a WTA is 
captured in a dummy variable that takes the value one if the individual answers 
affirmatively. Otherwise it is set to zero.
9
Figure 1: Definition of weekly working hours 
    Contract weekly hours  if person ∈ {treatment group} 
hours =   
Contract weekly hours  if person ∈ {control group} and overtime hours are 
compensated with time-off  
 
 
Actual weekly hours  if person ∈ {control group} and overtime hours are not 
compensated with time off 
7 
                                                 
8   We test two alternatives. First, we use contractual working hours for all individuals (assuming that even in 
the case of uncompensated overtime hours, contractual hours represent the better measure, because actual hours 
may vary a lot from one month to the other). Second, we use contractual hours if overtime hours are 
compensated by time-off and actual hours if not. This definition would be appropriate if WTAs were not 
flexible enough to absorb all fluctuations in weekly working hours, such that part of the accumulated overtime 
hours are paid or expire.   
9   The question on work time accounts follows a so called filter question: only employees who report to 
eventually work overtime hours are directed to this question. Hence, the dummy variable “work time account” 
is set to zero for all individuals who do not report overtime.   8 
                                                
4 Empirical  results 
4.1  Propensity Score Estimation 
The PS is estimated in a standard probit model, where variables influencing both the 
propensity to hold a WTA as well as the wage level are incorporated. Economic and social 
theories provide guidance in choosing the relevant variables. We distinguish between four 
sets of variables:
 10
•  Personal characteristics such as age, marital status and information on children, 
•  Human capital characteristics such as qualification level, work experience, job status 
and tenure  
•  Job or firm characteristics such as occupation, industry and public/private sector 
information, firm size 
•  Employment status such as working full-time, part-time or marginal working hours 
A descending specification search based on LR-tests is applied in order to obtain a final set 
of explanatory variables which yields stable predictions of the PSs. As most of the estimated 
coefficients have the expected signs and sizes, we will comment on selected coefficients 
only (the estimation results for women and men are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix). 
In general, personal characteristics prove to be rather weak predictors for the likelihood of 
having a WTA. Human capital variables, on the contrary, seem to be more important in 
determining the use of WTAs. Three results are worth mentioning. First, there are regional 
differences. East German men and women have a significantly higher probability of using an 
account than their West German colleagues. One reason may be that East German firms are 
younger on average and hence less restricted by well established organisational structures 
and employer-employee relationships. Second, even if flexible working hours are often 
praised as a family friendly work practice, the existence of one or more children aged up to 3 
years reveals a negative effect for females and no effect for males. Third, the negative signs 
of the university degree coefficients seem awkward at first glance but they may reflect the 
nature of high-skill jobs where employees are expected to work overtime hours without 
compensation. 
 
10 More information on the firm side or the process of implementing WTAs would be appreciated but is not 
available together with the workers’ characteristics in any data set we know of. In this sense, the GSOEP data 
provides the most affluent description of variables related to the existence of a WTA at an individual work 
place. 9 
The results with respect to the job-related variables indicate that access to a WTA depends 
on the occupational status as well as on the sector affiliation. From a theoretical point of 
view it is not unambiguous which sector has a lower or higher likelihood for WTAs. On one 
hand the employer-employee relationship may be more consensus-oriented in the public 
sector. Hence, if workers value flexible work hours, accounts will more likely be offered in 
the public sector. On the other hand, competitive pressure may be greater in the private 
sector. Hence, if productivity increases with flexibility, private employers will be more 
likely to introduce accounts. The results display a higher probability for WTAs in the private 
sector for males whereas for females public sector employment has a positive but not 
statistically significant coefficient. However, the effect for females may be imbibed by the 
industry variables, especially by the categories "education, health, law, church" and "public 
administration". 
Several studies stress the importance of firm size in the context of flexible work time. For 
example Ludewig (2001) argues that introducing WTAs involves high fixed costs and low 
marginal costs. If this is the case, WTAs will be relatively more favorable for large firms, 
since fixed costs per employee are decreasing with the number of employees. Our results are 
in accordance with these deliberations.  
Given the coefficient estimates, we predict the PS for all those individuals in the sample for 
whom wage information is available. To check whether the density functions provide 
common support, we illustrate the predicted PSs for the samples of accountees and the 




















Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 2002. 



























Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 2002. 
10 The density functions seem to provide common support, although we have difficulties 
finding control persons with exactly the same characteristics for females at the far right of 
the score scale. Nevertheless, matches can be found for all accountees even for those at the 
margins of the PS distribution.  
4.2  Matching Results  
The selection of an adequate control person for each treated individual is based on the 
predicted PSs. This procedure controls for selection on observable characteristics. Apart 
from that, differences between the private and public sector are accommodated by applying a 
within-sector matching approach. Hence, we first do an exact matching on the sector (public 
or private) followed by a PS matching within sectors. This procedure allows us to also 
account for unobserved sector-specific heterogeneity. As a result, wage differentials due to 
specific job characteristics in the public versus private sector can be disentangled from the 
financial effects resulting directly from WTAs.  
In the first two columns of Table A2 and A3 in the Appendix, the means of all variables 
included in the PS estimation are given separately for the accountees and all potential control 
men and women. The third columns provide variable means of the selected control group. 
As one can see, the average values of the control groups resemble the samples of WTA users 
more than the respective control reservoirs do. The difference between the treated and the 
(potential) control persons can be described by the standardized difference in percent, which 
was first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). The standardized difference 















k X  and  control
k X  denote the sample means of each covariate in the treated group 
and the control reservoir (column 2), respectively the actual control group (column 3). 
treated
k σ  and  control
k σ  denote the corresponding sample variances. Comparing the last two 
columns of Table A2 and A3 indicate that the difference between employees using WTAs 
reduces remarkably after applying within-sector propensity matching. We therefore conclude 
that our matching algorithm successfully reduces the difference with respect to observable 
characteristics. The results of the match procedure are presented in Table 2. 
11 12 
Table 2: Wage differentials after the matching procedure with pre-matching on the sector 











Log Wage   2.783  2.743  0.041  2.568  2.435  0.134 
ATT  2.783 2.681 0.103  2.568 2.505 0.063 
ATE     0.083     0.048 
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 2002. 
The wages of male accountees in the before-matching sample are on average 4 percent 
higher than the wages of men without a working time account. After controlling for 
differences in observed characteristics the wage differential increases to statistically 
significant 10.3 percent
11. This means that a randomly chosen man from the sample of 
accountees earns 10.3 percent more than if he had no WTA. This result indicates that low-
wage men with lower paid personal and job characteristics are more likely to have a WTA. 
The average treatment effect (ATE) is also positive and of almost same size as the ATT. 
Hence, a randomly drawn man from the total sample would earn an 8.3 percent higher wage 
if he had a WTA.  
For female employees, the results are somewhat different. Without controlling for 
differences in observed covariates, women with an account earn 13.4 percent higher wages 
on average. As the ATT of 6.3 percent in Table 2 tells us, this wage differential diminishes 
after balancing the samples with respect to observable characteristics
12. Unlike men, women 
with higher paid characteristics are more likely to work in firms with accounts. Furthermore, 
it is interesting to note that, as for men, the ATE is lower than the ATT.
13 The difference 
between ATT and ATE provides some information about the selection in WTA: female and 
male employees with an account get higher compensation for their flexible work time than 
those without an account.  
The positive ATTs for males and females indicate that work time accountees do not earn 
higher wages due to differences in observed and unobserved characteristics (as long as they 
                                                 
11 Bootstrapping with 200 replications yields a standard error of 0.019. 
12 Bootstrapping with 200 replications yields a standard error of 0.058. 
13 As a sensitivity analysis, we also applied an OLS specification. We regressed the logarithm of the gross wage 
rate on all variables entering the propensity score estimation. In this setting, male accountees earn 8 percent more 
than their colleagues with fixed working hours and female accountees obtain a wage premium of 6 percent. 
Hence, the ATE and OLS results do not differ qualitatively. 13 
are correlated with the sector choice). We interpreted the wage surplus as a compensating 
wage differential for flexible work hours. This result leads one to suppose that overall the 
use of WTAs is more likely to be driven by employer’s request than by demand for more 
time sovereignty by the employees (see also Klenner 1997 and Eberling et al. 2004).  
4.3  Heterogeneous Wage Effects 
So far, the results of the matching approach describe the average wage surplus of employees 
using WTAs. According to the theory of compensating wage differentials, this observed 
premium suggests that WTAs are particularly used to shift working hours according to 
operational requirements of the firm rather than to provide better reconciliation of work and 
family life or to reduce the unemployment risk on the worker’s side. However, the handling 
of WTAs might differ across firms or employees. It might seem conceivable that individuals 
with higher bargaining power, e.g. high-skilled workers or employees with long tenure, may 
receive higher compensations for sometimes “inconvenient” working hours than less 
demanded or organised employees. Furthermore, the surplus might depend upon the 
specification of the WTA. Work time arrangements that allow longer time periods to balance 
may cause higher wage compensations than traditional flextime models where overtime 
hours have to be settled within one month, because long settlement periods bear the risk of 
never being compensated for and hence the loss in time sovereignty tends to be more 
important for these employees. 
In a next step, we will exploit the heterogeneity of the treatment effects by conditioning the 
ATT on a set of worker and firm-specific characteristics, including qualification levels, 
region, sector and firm size dummies as well as tenure. We apply a regression analysis where 
the dependent variable is the difference in wages between each treated and its control person. 
Since we expect the wage premium to increase with the length of the settling period, we 
regress on two dummy variables denoting the period of time in which the account has to be 
settled. The variable long settlement captures the effect of WTAs with settlement periods of 
more than one year and short settlement is equal to one if the period is less than one year. 
Firms whose accounts have to be settled within one year belong to the reference group.  
The OLS estimation results are presented in Table 3. As one can see, for males there are no 
significant differences between the various settling periods. For females, however, short 
settlement periods (< one year) lead to significantly smaller compensations. The other 
coefficients draw a more plausible and uniform picture. Employees in the public sector get 
smaller premia for WTAs than those in the private sector. This can be explained by different 14 
motives to implement work time arrangements in the private or public sector. In the public 
sector, WTAs serve to improve the work conditions of employees rather than to balance 
demand fluctuations. As a result, employees are relatively free to decide when to start and 
end their work days. In the private sector, time accounts are often used to record ordered 
overtime hours without having to pay overtime premia. These overtime accounts are still 
dominant in most industry sectors (Seifert 2003). Consequently, employees with WTAs in 
the public sector tend to enjoy more time sovereignty than accountees in the private sector 
and, hence, get smaller, if any, compensation. 
The results further show that the compensation increases with the size of the firm. This 
observation may be due to the fact that in larger firms negotiations about WTAs involve 
work councils who often have more bargaining power than non-organised employees in 
smaller firms. We also identify a statistically significant relationship between the wage 
premia paid for WTAs and the qualification level of employees. Male employees with a 
vocational college degree or university diploma are compensated to a much higher degree. In 
contrast, male employees without any vocational training get almost the same compensation 
as those with completed apprenticeship training. For women, a positive coefficient can only 
be observed for employees with university degree. However, women without completed 
apprenticeship training receive a significantly lower compensation for the use of flexible 
working hours. It may be argued that for low or medium qualified employees the positive 
effect of WTAs due to the reduced unemployment risk seems to over-compensate the 
potential loss of time sovereignty. As a result, they might be willing to forego wage 
surcharge. Since high qualified employees have better employment chances on average and 
employers are more interested to bind these employees to the firm, their compensation for 
flexible and sometimes inconvenient working hours is likely to be higher. 
Our results seem to indicate that the job stabilizing effect of WTAs is more important in East 
Germany: employees of East German firms are willing to accept a lower compensation than 
those in West Germany. Tenure, finally, is positively related to a mark-up on having a WTA. 
This holds true for male as well as female workers. The reason might be larger bargaining 
power of more senior employees. 15 
Table 3: ATT conditional on selected characteristics  
 Males  Females 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Short settlement  -0.031  0.031  -0,024  0,034 
Long settlement  0.003  0.029 -0,016  0,034 
Public sector  -0.170  0.029  -0,099  0,030 
20 – under 200 employees  0.186  0.041  0,132  0,041 
200 – under 2000 employees   0.316  0.042  0,148  0,042 
2000 and more employees  0.348 0.041 0,164 0,044 
Vocational training not completed  0.005  0.055  -0,188  0,059 
Vocational college degree  0.149  0.031  -0,012  0,035 
University  diploma  0.353 0.032 0,259 0,038 
East Germany  -0.290  0.030  -0,212  0,032 
Tenure  0.008 0.001 0,013 0,002 
No. of observations  1,929  1,545 
Adj R-squared  0.2002  0.1091 
Source: Own calculations based on the matched sample of individuals with and without WTAs from GSOEP 
2002. 
5  Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to assess the wage effect of flexible work time schedules, 
particularly work time accounts. While proponents of flexible work hours praise the 
increasing flexibility for both the firm and the employees, a rising number of studies shows 
that more flexibility for one side, e.g. quick adjustment to seasonal demand fluctuations, may 
cause a burden for the other, e.g. reduced time sovereignty. According to the theory of 
compensating wage differentials, variation in individual work conditions – such as time 
sovereignty or job security – should show up in wage premia or discounts respectively. To 
identify the net effect, we therefore determine the wage differential between employees with 
and without flexible work hours.  
With traditional PS matching we can show that the average treatment effect for the treated 
amounts to about 10 percent for male and 6 percent for female employees. Without 
controlling for differences in observed covariates this differential is smaller for men whereas 
it more than doubles for women, thus indicating a gender-specific selection into jobs with 
WTAs. Whereas low income men with lower paid personal and job characteristics are more 
likely to have a WTA, the opposite is true for women. We then exploit the heterogeneity of 
the treatment effects by conditioning the ATT on a set of worker and firm-specific 16 
characteristics. The results indicate that variations in the wage effects of WTAs are related to 
public versus private sector affiliation, firm size, region and human capital variables such as 
education level and tenure. 
It has to be noted, that the observed wage differential between jobs with a WTA and those 
without may not solely be explained by differences in working conditions. Empirical 
evidence shows that flexible hours may also have positive effects on work attendance, 
turnover or employees’ working morale (see e.g. Allen, 1981, McGuire and Liro 1986 or 
Dalton and Mesch 1990). As a result, flextime firms seem to operate more productively as 
well as more efficiently (see e.g. Kim & Campagna 1981, Shepard, Clifton and Kruse 1996 
or Wolf and Beblo 2004). Given that the number of firms using flexible work time schedules 
is on the rise, employers may be forced to share in the marginal returns to WTAs with their 
employees, because more outside options are available. Hence, part of the wage premium for 
flexible work schedules might be attributed to the positive productivity effect. 17 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1: Probit estimation results of the likelihood of a WTA 
 Men  Women 
Variable  Coeff.   Std. Error  Coeff.  Std. Error 
Personal characteristics      
   Age  -0.0296  0.0090  -0.0071  0.0115 
    Children < 3 years  ---  ---  -0.8453  0.2609 
   East  Germany  0.2051  0.0450  0.1086  0.0488 
  Partner information      
    Partner with a full-time (ft) job  ---  ---  -0.1010  0.0466 
    Partner with a part-time (pt) job  ---  ---  0.3164  0.1653 
    Partner with a marginal job  ---  ---  -0.9311  0.3210 
Human capital       
  Qualification (ref:apprenticeship)       
   No  vocational  training  -0.2604  0.0742  -0.0880  0.0769 
   Vocational  college  degree  0.0667  0.0499  0.1638  0.0513 
   University  diploma  -0.1377  0.0597  -0.0430  0.0640 
  Work experience      
    Experience in full-time employment   0.0224  0.0055  -0.0027  0.0065 
    Experience in ft employment
2 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 
    Experience in part-time employment   0.0578    0.0381  0.0193  0.0102 
    Experience in pt employment
2 -0.0061 0.0045  -0.0009 0.0005 
  Interaction terms      
    Age * experience in ft employment  0.0178  0.0085  -0.0020  0.0117 
    Age * experience in pt employment  0.0146  0.0090  0.0049  0.0120 
Job characteristics         
  Occupational status      
    Trained and untrained workers  -0.0422  0.0734  -0.4546  0.0605 
    Skilled blue collar workers   0.2438  0.0653  -0.1615  0.0953 
    Foreman and master craftsman  0.1503  0.1157  -0.6345  0.3571 
    White collar w/ low qualification  0.1998  0.0620     
    White collar w/ high qualification      -0.0756  0.0668 
   Civil servants of a lower and middle 
level status 
0.2002 0.1210  -0.0913 0.1434 
   Civil servants of an upper and 
executive level status  
0.0881 0.0910  -0.4667 0.1002 20 
 
.... Table A1 continued      
  Sector (ref: private sector)      
    Public sector   0.2084  0.0682  0.0629  0.0595 
    Public * pt employment  ---  ---  0.1926  0.0911 
    Public * age  ---  ---  -0.0103  0.0043 
  Firm size (ref: < 20 employees)      
    20 – under 200 employees  0.1203  0.0559  0.1949  0.0533 
    200 – under 2000 employees   0.3521  0.0603  0.4760  0.0604 
    2000 and more employees  0.4385  0.0609  0.2932  0.0623 
Work hour status(ref: full-time empl.)      
   Part-time  employment  ---  ---  -0.4009  0.1976 
   Marginal  employment  ---  ---  -0.8420  0.4808 
No. of observations  5,207  4,713 
R
2 0.0587 0.0896 
Note: The results for the industry variables are omitted but are available on request. The probit estimation 
sample includes more observations than the matching sample due to missing values on the hourly wage rate. 
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 2002. 21 



















Age   40.673  42.340  41.143  -17.374  -5.02 
East Germany  0.244  0.201  0.252  10.406  -1.78 
No vocational training   0.056  0.095  0.064  -14.901  -3.66 
Vocational training  0.502  0.447  0.469  10.942  6.76 
Vocational college degree  0.248  0.193  0.283  13.257  -8.12 
University diploma  0.235  0.318  0.227  -18.441  2.06 
Experience in ft employment  15.737  15.356  16.256  3.469  -4.92 
Experience in pt employment  0.227  0.286  0.220  -5.540  0.76 
Trained and untrained workers  0.114  0.155  0.107  -12.205  2.12 
Skilled blue collar workers   0.298  0.232  0.313  15.131  -3.11 
Foreman and master craftsman  0.033  0.027  0.042  3.463  -5.11 
White collar w/ low qualification  0.204  0.173  0.203  7.901  0.25 
White collar w/ high qualification  0.227  0.308  0.205  -18.339  5.35 
Civil servants of a lower and middle 
level status 
0.051 0.024 0.066  14.312 -6.35 
Civil servants of an upper and 
executive level status  
0.073 0.081 0.064  -3.271  3.45 
Public sector  0.280  0.231  0.280  11.343  0 
Under 20 employees  0.145  0.204  0.153  -15.613  -2.27 
20 – under 200 employees  0.251  0.327  0.259  -16.796  -1.64 
200 – under 2000 employees   0.269  0.231  0.238  8.816  7.06 
2000 and more employees  0.335  0.237  0.350  21.658  -3.24 
No. of observations   1,954  2,494  1,954     
No. of individuals   1,954  2,494  1,076     
Note: The results for the industry variables and interactions terms are omitted but are available on request. The 
number of observation in column (2) is lower than that of the gross sample of non-accountees due to missing 
values.  
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 2002. 22 
Table A3: Descriptive statistics of the variables in the probit estimation for women  

















Age 39.595  41.605  39.674  -20.79  -0.44 
Kids aged under 3 years  0.003  0.010  0.001  -8.41  -7.38 
East Germany  0.277  0.238  0.304  8.82  -4.77 
Part-time employment   0.356  0.400  0.339  -9.11  4.81 
Marginal employment  0.013  0.060  0.010  -24.94  2.33 
Partner in ft employment  0.603  0.634  0.649  -6.54  -0.13 
Partner in pt employment  0.018  0.014  0.017  3.61  -4.77 
Partner in marginal employment  0.002  0.007  0.002  -8.04  1.59 
Vocational training not completed  0.068  0.116  0.077  -16.72  2.05 
Vocational training  0.438  0.442  0.417  -0.86  0.90 
Vocational  college  degree  0.294 0.212 0.303 18.97  1.12 
University diploma  0.220  0.242  0.222  -5.09  -3.18 
Experience in ft employment  9.848  10.387  10.071  -5.74  -0.16 
Experience in pt employment  2.879  3.455  2.906  -11.16  1.33 
Trained and untrained workers  0.114  0.239  0.113  -33.27  3.27 
Skilled blue collar workers   0.045  0.045  0.043  0.01  -2.96 
Foreman and master craftsman  0.002  0.003  0.001  -2.27  -2.52 
White collar w/ low qualification  0.615  0.487  0.640  25.77  -1.57 
White collar w/ high qualification  0.144  0.127  0.142  5.02  -1.44 
Civil servants of a lower and middle 
level status 
0.025 0.015 0.012  7.26  4.77 
Civil servants of an upper and 
executive level status  
0.050 0.079 0.046  -11.99  4.28 
Public  sector  0.409 0.342 0.409 13.87  0 
Under 20 employees  0.204  0.326  0.191  -27.91  -20.61 
20 – under 200 employees  0.282  0.311  0.286  -6.39  -2.94 
200 – under 2000 employees   0.277  0.174  0.273  24.89  -2.82 
2000 and more employees  0.237  0.188  0.249  11.83  6.87 
No. observation  1,575  2,308  1,575     
No. individuals  1,575  2,308  917     
Note: The results for the industry variables and interaction terms are omitted but are available on request. The 
number of observations in column (2) is lower than that of the gross sample of non-accountees due to missing 
values. 
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP 2002. 
 